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Introduction
According to optimal taxation theory, the tax rate on capital income should be zero in the long run. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) …rst showed this, and the result has subsequently proven robust to a number of extensions and alternative assumptions. In particular, Judd (1985) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) show that this result holds even if the social planner only cares about workers that do not hold assets, or if the planner only cares about any other group in the economy. 1 In addition to being theoretically robust, the implications of optimal taxation theory seem to be quantitatively important. Cooley and Hansen (1992) …nd that the welfare gain of eliminating capital taxes can amount to several percent of annual consumption, and Lucas (1990, p. 314) argues that the Ramsey optimal taxation literature has "generated the largest genuinely free lunch I have seen in 25 years in this business". 2 Still, capital income taxes remain high. Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) document that the average capital income tax rate is 52 percent in the OECD countries if the tax is based on net operating surplus and 27 percent if it is based on gross operating surplus. 3 The present paper provides some insights to why implementing the optimal tax policies is more di¢ cult than previous studies acknowledge. In particular, I demonstrate that even though all groups agree that capital income taxes should be eliminated in the long run, the distributional e¤ects of optimal tax reform may be important. And households that agree on what taxes should be in the long run, need not agree on how to get from today's tax system to a new steady state.
The idea to quantitatively evaluate the distributional e¤ects of hypothetical tax reforms is not new. Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) examined how welfare of di¤erent cohorts would be a¤ected if capital income taxed were replaced by higher consumption or labor income taxes in a life-cycle setting. In studies more related to the present, Garcia-Milà et al. (2001) , Domeij and Heathcote (2004) , and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) examine the e¤ects of tax reforms in the presence of income and wealth heterogeneity in dynastic settings. Common to all these studies is that they do not consider optimal tax reforms in the sense that the theoretical literature has analyzed. Instead they concentrate on once-and-for all reforms where new constant tax rates are suddenly implemented. 4 In the present paper, I follow the literature on Ramsey optimal tax reforms and solve for policies that maximize the utility of some particular (for example the representative) household in an economy with a realistic distribution of wealth and earnings.
I demonstrate that these policy reforms typically are not Pareto improving. For example, households with a high wealth to earnings ratio su¤er a welfare loss equivalent to a 20 percent permanent reduction of consumption if the policy that maximizes the representa-tive household's utility is implemented. Although I rule out con…scatory taxation in the initial period, these wealthy households su¤er from an extremely high tax on capital income in the second period. 5 I also consider optimal taxation under the restriction that the capital income tax rate may not be raised from the initial level. A policy that maximizes the representative household's utility then keeps the current tax rate on capital income for 28 years before the tax is eliminated, and the welfare e¤ects of that policy are small except for a small fraction of households in the top and bottom of the wealth to earnings distribution.
The next section presents the theoretical framework. The key ingredients are a neoclassical production function with capital and labor; in…nitely lived households that choose consumption and labor supply to maximize utility, and that are heterogenous with respect to initial wealth and skills; and economic policy that must satisfy a dynamic budget constraint. The framework abstracts from uncertainty and the skill heterogeneity is permanent. Section 3 describes the optimal taxation problem, and Section 4 describes how the model is parameterized to be consistent with U.S. data. Section 5 presents the results with an emphasis on distributional implications of tax reforms. The optimal taxation problem is solved for di¤erent social welfare functions, and with various restrictions on the tax paths. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Model

Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of in…nitely lived households that maximize life-time utility,
where is the time discount factor, u is the instantaneous utility function, c is consumption, and h is labor supply. Let r denote the interest rate and k the tax rate on capital income, and let R = 1+ 1 k r denote the gross after tax interest rate. The households' budget constraint is then
where a t+1 denotes savings from period t to period t + 1, h is the labor-income tax rate, w is the wage rate, z is the household's labor productivity, and c is the consumption tax. The per-period budget constraints can also be combined as
where the price of consumption in the …rst period is normalized to unity, q 0 = 1, and q t+1 = q t =R t+1 .
Households di¤er with respect to labor productivity z, and initial asset holdings a 0 , but have identical preferences. Following Greenwood et al. (1988) I assume that the utility function is
where can be thought of as the degree of risk aversion, and is the intertemporal labor supply elasticity.
Using the households'…rst order conditions,
and
the budget constraint can be rewritten as the implementability constraint
Production
The representative …rm is a price taker and chooses factor inputs K and L on a competitive market to maximize pro…ts,
is the production function, K is the aggregate capital stock, L is e¢ ciency units of labor, and is the depreciation rate of capital.
The Government
Government spending is exogenously …xed at the per capita level G, and …nanced by taxes on labor earnings, capital income, and private consumption. All taxes are proportional and tax rates are identical for all agents. The government's budget constraint is then
where D is public debt. 6
6 Only policies with a constant consumption tax will be considered, so the time subindex on c will be ignored.
Equilibrium
Let s = (z; a 0 ) denote a household's productivity and initial wealth, and let (s) denote the measure of households over initial states. Following Atkeson et al. (1999) let t = h t ; k t ; c denote the tax policy in period t, let x t = (c t (s) ; h t (s) ; a t (s)) denote household allocations, and let p t = (r t ; w t ) denote factor prices. Let also = f t g 1 t=0 , X = fx t g 1 t=0 , P = fp t g 1 t=0 , and D = fD t g 1 t=0 denote the paths for policy, allocations, factor prices, and public debt. For future reference, let also A t = R a t (s) d and C t = R c t (s) d denote aggregate asset holdings and consumption in period t.
Before de…ning a competitive equilibrium in this environment, it will be useful to introduce some further notation. De…nition 1 therefore de…nes factor prices, household decisions, and asset and debt allocations as functions of the tax policy. De…nition 2 then provides the de…nition of a competitive equilibrium, and De…nition 3 provides the de…nition of a feasible government policy.
De…nition 1 An allocation rule X, a price rule P, and a debt rule D map a policy into an allocation X = X ( ), a price system P = P ( ), and a path for public debt D = D ( ) such that 1. The households'consumption, labor supply, and savings decisions X solve the households' optimization problem given the policy .
2. The representative …rm's capital and labor input solve the …rm's optimization problem in all periods t, i.e.
where the aggregate capital stock is K t = A t D t and where aggregate e¢ ciency units of labor supply is
3. Public debt evolves according to the public budget constraint (8) where initial debt D 0 is given.
De…nition 2 A competitive equilibrium consists of a measure of households over initial states, a policy , household allocations X = X ( ), a price system P = P ( ), a path for public debt D = D ( ), and a level of government consumption G, such that.
1. The government's budget constraint is ful…lled and Ponzi schemes are ruled out, i.e.
2. The economy's resource constraint
is ful…lled in all periods t.
De…nition 3 A government policy is feasible if ( ; ; X ( ) ; P ( ) ; D ( ) ; G) constitutes a competitive equilibrium.
Aggregation and Disaggregation -The Representative Household
and A 0 = R a 0 d . The utility function (4) then allows us to capture the economy's aggregate consumption and e¢ cient labor supply by the behavior of a representative agent with productivity Z and initial assets A 0 . Propositions 1 and 2 below demonstrate this.
Proof. The intratemporal …rst order condition (5) implies that
A household with productivity Z thus supplies
e¢ ciency units of labor. From the de…nition of Z we thus get
We want to show that
which equals L t according to (11).
Proposition 2 A household with productivity Z = R z 1+ d
1+
and initial wealth
Proof. The …rst part of the proof demonstrates that the budget constraint for a household with productivity Z and initial wealth A 0 is identical to the aggregate of all households' budget constraints. The second part of the proof demonstrates that the households'Euler equations imply a path for aggregate consumption that is identical to the path implied by the Euler equation for the household with productivity Z and initial wealth A 0 .
Integrate the budget constraint (3) over all households to get
By using R zh t d = Zh t (Z) from Proposition 1, this aggregate budget constraint can be rewritten as
which is also the budget constraint for an agent with initial states (Z; A 0 ).
Using (4) and (10) in the Euler equation (6) gives
Integrate over all households to get
which is also the Euler equation for a household with initial states (Z; A 0 ). The budget constraint and Euler equation for a household with initial states (Z; A 0 ) are thus identical to the economy aggregates, and it follows that this household's consumption and wealth paths are identical to the economy's aggregate consumption and wealth paths.
As a direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2, a policy is feasible in the heterogenousagents economy if and only if the policy is feasible in the economy populated by a single representative agent with initial states (Z; A 0 ). Furthermore, the households'…rst order conditions (5) and (6), and their implementability constraints (7), provide a mapping from the representative-agent economy to allocations in the disaggregated heterogenous-agents economy. Proposition 3 summarizes these statements.
Proposition 3 Consider a representative-agent economy with allocations X RA and implied prices P . If X RA and P ful…ll the resource constraint (9) and the implementability constraint (7), then (i) there is a unique policy such that X RA = X ( ) and P = P ( ), and ( RA ; ; X RA ; P; D ( ) ; G) constitutes a competitive equilibrium for the representative-agent economy; and (ii) there is a unique allocation X = X ( ) such that ( ; ; X; P; D ( ) ; G) constitutes a competitive equilibrium for the disaggregated economy.
Optimal Tax Policies
I will now consider optimal policies. Throughout I assume that the government has access to a commitment technology so that time-inconsistency problems can be ignored. To …nd the optimal policy, I use the primal approach and let the government choose an allocation X RA for the representative agent under the additional constraint that these sequences are consistent with household optimization. 7 As noted in Proposition 3, a policy that is feasible in the representative-agent economy is also feasible in the heterogenous-agents economy, and there is a unique disaggregated allocation that is implied by that policy.
In the baseline policy experiments, the consumption tax rate is …xed at its initial level, and I assume that the capital income tax rate cannot be changed in the …rst period. 8;9 Assume that tax policy is chosen to maximize the welfare of an agent with initial state s. 10 The Ramsey allocation problem is then
subject to the resource constraint (9) and the implementability constraint for the representative household,
and where the household choices c t (s) and h t (s) are part of the allocation X that is implied by X RA .
After the model has been calibrated (next section) the system of …rst order conditions to this problem is solved numerically. 11
Calibration and the Initial Steady State
Policy variables and parameter values for the baseline model are chosen to match U.S. data. One model period corresponds to one year, the capital share in production is 0.40, the depreciation rate of capital is 0.10, and the discount factor is chosen to obtain a capital to output ratio of 3.0 in the initial steady state. In the utility function, the degree of risk aversion is set to two and the labor-supply elasticity is set to 0.5. The weight on leisure is chosen so that hours worked is 1/3 in the initial steady state. The initial public debt is 60 percent of output, the consumption tax is 6.1 percent, and initial tax rates on capital and labor income are 31.1 and 22.6 percent, respectively. 12 Government spending is chosen so 7 See Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, chapter 15) for an overview of the primal approach to Ramsey optimal taxation. 8 There is a continuum of tax policies that implement the optimal allocation if all three tax rates are choice variables. 9 This assumption is standard in the literature and used to rule out lump sum taxation. There are a number of valid objections to this assumption. For example, high capital income taxes in the second period are close to lump sum taxation. And in the current setting there is no need to rule out lump sum taxation since distributional e¤ects are considered -if lump sum taxation is e¢ cient and all agents agree on this, it should be used.
1 0 I only consider policies that maximize welfare of one particular agent. It would be interesting to also consider policies that maximize, for example, the utilitarian welfare function but this turns out to be computationally infeasible. I have, however, examined policies that maximize the utility of small groups of households. The insights are then similar to those with only one optimized household.
1 1 See Appendix A for further details on the solution method. The economy is assumed to have reached a new steady state T periods after the policy change. For most speci…cations, I use T = 150.
1 2 These tax rates are from table 4 in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) .
that the government budget balances in the initial steady state. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the baseline speci…cation of the model and calibrated quantities and variables in the initial steady state. 
Distributions
The government's policies can be found without knowing how labor productivity and initial wealth are distributed in the population, but to evaluate the distributional e¤ects of policy choices, these distributions must be speci…ed. I choose these distributions to match the facts on U.S. inequality reported in Budría Rodríguez et al. (2002) . The distribution of initial wealth holdings is approximated by 100 values representing the di¤erent percentiles. To choose these values, I interpolate between the 11 observations from the Lorenz curve for wealth reported in Budría Rodríguez et al. (see Table 2 ).
Budría Rodríguez et al. also report data on average earnings for di¤erent wealth groups. One approach to calibrating the productivity distribution would be to calculate productivity for these wealth groups from the average earnings reported in Table 2 . That approach, however, implies an earnings distribution that is too compressed (Gini 0:33 rather than 0:61) and too correlated with wealth (correlation 0:95 rather than 0:47) compared to what Budría Rodríguez et al. report. Instead, I allow three di¤erent earnings levels for each wealth percentile. These earnings levels and the mass of households allocated to each of them is chosen under the constraint that the average earnings for the di¤erent wealth groups equals that in Table 2 . Furthermore, I follow an algorithm described in Appendix B to choose the distributions so that the earnings Gini is 0:61; the correlation between earnings and wealth is 0:47, and the mean-to-median ratio for earnings is 1:57, all values being identical to those reported by Budría Rodríguez et al. for U.S. data. Table 3 summarizes some properties of the calibrated wealth and earnings distributions. Note that the calibrated distributions also match the facts reported in Table 2 . 
Distributional E¤ects of Tax Reforms
In this section, I examine the distributional e¤ects of di¤erent tax reforms, with particular focus on Ramsey optimal tax reforms. A household's welfare gain of a policy reform is measured by the constant percentage that consumption must be increased in all periods in the original economy for the household to be as well o¤ as in the reformed economy. Utilitarian welfare gains are similarly measured by the percentage increase in all households' consumption that makes the average life-time utility in the benchmark economy identical to the average life-time utility in the reformed economy.
Let me …rst …x the consumption tax at its initial level and only consider changes in capital and labor income taxes. Table 4 shows the implications of tax reforms that maximize di¤erent households'welfare under di¤erent constraints on the policies allowed. Consider …rst the outcome when the representative household's utility is maximized under the constraint that the capital income tax rate cannot be changed in the …rst period (the column marked as reform 1 in Table 4 ). The optimal policy is then to reduce the labor income tax from 22:8 percent to 5:2 percent in the …rst period, and to raise the capital income tax dramatically, to 1634 percent, in the second period. The labor income tax rate is held almost constant at 16:6 percent from the second period, while the capital income tax slowly falls from 1:4 percent in the third period towards zero. This policy raises the representative household's welfare by 1:5 percent, and a majority (70 percent) of households in the economy bene…t from this policy reform. But initially wealthy households are hurt by the high capital tax in the second period. The wealthiest household would be prepared to give up 40:2 percent of its annual consumption to avoid the policy reform. 13 1 3 The 'wealth poor'household in Tables 4-7 has the lowest initial wealth to earnings ratio. This household has wealth from the bottom percentile ( 20 percent of the average), and the lowest earnings (12 percent of the average). The 'wealth rich'household has the highest initial wealth to earnings ratio. This Reforms 2 and 3 optimize with respect to a household that has the representative household's productivity but 70 or 130 percent of average wealth. There are still substantial welfare implications. When optimizing with respect to the household with little wealth, a majority of households still bene…t from the implied policy but wealthy households su¤er dramatically. Only 31 percent of households in the economy would bene…t from a policy that maximizes the utility of the household with 130 percent of average wealth.
Reforms 4 and 5 show the interval of Pareto improving policies. These policies maximize the utility of a household that has 25:6 to 25:9 percent more wealth than the average household. Note that the welfare e¤ects of these policies are modest, although not negligible. Although welfare e¤ects are modest, the tax reforms imply substantial reallocations between capital and labor income and over time. Small deviations from the Pareto improving reforms may therefore have important welfare consequences (see for example reform 3).
Arguably, the policies implied by reforms 1 to 5 are unrealistic in that they allow for very high capital tax rates. Taxes above 100 percent can be avoided if households withdraw capital from the market, and if households have some control of the timing of capital returns, temporary high tax rates below 100 percent may also be infeasible. In reforms 6 to 9, capital income tax rates are restricted not to exceed the initial tax rate. 14 The welfare e¤ects are then small, and in most scenarios the optimal policy is to let the capital tax rate remain at the present level for several decades. For example, when maximizing the representative household's utility, the optimal policy is to keep the capital tax at 31:1 percent for 28 years before it is cut to zero. Committing to policies that reduce taxes far in the future may be di¢ cult in practice.
Theory says that the capital income tax should be zero in the new steady state. Proponents of low capital income taxation sometimes use this theoretical result to argue that capital taxes should be abolished immediately. The …nal column in Table 4 shows that only 31 percent of households would bene…t from such a policy reform, and households with little wealth would su¤er substantial welfare losses. Under the Ramsey policy, the government initially taxes capital returns heavily and thereby reduce government debt and accumulate assets. This public wealth enables the government to reduce the tax on labor income. But when initially high capital taxes are not allowed, the eliminated capital tax must be compensated by higher taxes on labor income and this hurts households with a high wage to wealth ratio.
Note that even the representative household dislikes a policy that immediately eliminates capital income taxation. Previous studies report mixed results on this issue. In a representative agent economy, Chari et al. (1994) found a small positive welfare gain in their benchmark economy with log utility, but a small welfare loss under high risk aversion. Domeij and Heatcote (2004) found a clear welfare gain (1:5 percent) when labor supply is exogenous. With endogenous labor supply, they report that only 25 percent of househousehold has wealth that is 3:0 times the average and earnings that are 12 percent of the average. Another wealth rich household has wealth equal to 9:5 times the average and earnings equal to 84 percent of the average. Welfare e¤ects for this household are in general similar.
1 4 Domeij and Klein (2005) argue that there may be implementation lags so that tax rates cannot be changed immediately. They demonstrate that the optimal capital tax never exceeds the initial rate if the lag is su¢ ciently long.
holds bene…t from an immediate removal of capital income taxation, but the representative household could possibly belong to that group (since the median household has less wealth than the representative household). In the sensitivity analysis below, I only …nd a positive welfare e¤ect on the representative household when the labor-supply elasticity is low.
So far, we have considered reforms that maximize welfare for households with the representative household's productivity. Median productivity in the economy is 74 percent of the representative household's productivity. The implications of policies that maximize welfare for households with median productivity have also been examined. For any given initial wealth position, these households have a higher wealth to wage ratio. The implied policies therefore put more emphasis on reducing capital taxation. A household with median productivity but average initial wealth would prefer a policy that initially subsidizes wealth holdings. Wealth poor households would su¤er substantially from such policies, but even the representative household would be worse o¤.
A typical …nding in the public …nance literature is that consumption taxation is less distortionary and more e¢ cient than income taxation. 15 The reforms considered in Table  5 are identical to the baseline reforms in Table 4 , except that the consumption tax rate is raised from 6:1 percent (the U.S. level) to 17:1 percent (the OECD average) at the time of reform. In general, the welfare gains in Table 5 are somewhat higher than those in Table  4 . There is thus some support for the claim that consumption taxes are less distortionary than income taxes, but the di¤erences are small and the general conclusions from the baseline experiments still apply. More interestingly the results indicate some scope for a realistic Pareto improving tax reform. All households would bene…t by a reform that immediately raises the consumption tax to 17:1 percent and that eliminates capital taxes after three to …ve years. The surprise increase in consumption taxes reduces the value of previously accumulated wealth and works as a substitute for higher capital income taxes.
The public …nance literature also concludes that the deadweight loss of taxation increases more than proportionally in the tax rate, i.e. that additional taxation becomes more distortionary when taxes are already high. It is therefore possible that optimal taxation theory implies larger welfare gains for countries with higher tax rates than the U.S., where taxes are low in an international perspective. Table 6 reports results for optimal tax reforms for a country calibrated where initial tax rates are calibrated to match the European average. Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) report that the average tax rate is 25:1 percent on capital income, 36:8 percent on labor income, and 18:7 percent on consumption income. 16 As expected, the welfare e¤ects of tax reforms under European policies reported in Table  6 are typically larger than in the experiments with U.S. policies reported previously. For example, the policy that is optimal for the resentative household now raises this household's welfare by 5:9 percent of annual consumption compared to only 1:5 percent under U.S. policies. But the negative welfare e¤ects are also ampli…ed, and the welfare gains of Pareto improving reforms are still small. Table 7 summarizes the results of tax reforms that maximize the representative household's 1 5 See Krusell et al. (1996) for references, and for an analysis of redistributional e¤ects of di¤erent forms of taxation.
1 6 Except for tax policies, the economy is still calibrated to match U.S. data. 
(1) Notes: Optimization with respect to household with average productivity and wealth indicated by column head.
a)
Percent of annual consumption, 'wealth poor'household has the lowest capital/productivity ratio, 'wealth rich'household has the highest capital/productivity ratio, 'median'household is the median with respect to welfare e¤ects.
b)
indicates percent change from initial to new steady state, debt is in percent of output. Notes: The consumption tax rate is raised from 6.1% to 17.1% at the time of reform. See also Table 4. welfare under a number of alternative model parameterizations. 17 The …rst …ve result columns show implications of optimal tax reforms under the constraint that the capital income tax rate is …xed in the …rst period and the …nal …ve columns show implications of policies that immediately abolish capital income taxation. In the …rst of these columns, the labor supply elasticity is reduced to = 0:1. The most interesting implication of the lower elasticity is that the representative household now bene…ts from an immediate elimination of capital income taxes. This is consistent with Domeij and Heatcote (2004) who …nd that the representative agent bene…ts from an immediate elimination of capital taxation when labor supply is exogenous, and the result is intuitive since labor taxes become less distortionary (and thus more e¢ cient relative capital income taxes) when labor supply is less elastic. The experiments with variations in the labor supply elasticity also show that optimal taxation theory and the potential welfare e¤ects are more important when taxes are more distortionary. Here more distortions are generated by a higher labor supply elasticity. Previously we came to the same conclusion by raising the size of the public sector (see Table 6 ).
The other robustness checks presented in Table 7 are a lower capital to output ratio; a lower capital share in production; and a lower depreciation rate of capital. Again, these experiments a¤ect the magnitudes of welfare e¤ects but do not change the conclusion that distributional implications are important. A lower capital to output ratio and a lower depreciation rate of capital raise the welfare e¤ects somewhat compared to the baseline speci…cation, and a lower capital share in production reduces the welfare e¤ects.
Concluding Discussion
Tax reforms implied by the Ramsey optimal taxation literature may have dramatic distributional e¤ects. Although all households agree that capital income taxation should be eliminated in the long run, they do not agree on how to eliminate these taxes. Wealthy households would prefer a reform that is funded mostly by higher taxes on labor income while households with little wealth would prefer a reform that is funded mostly by high taxes on initial wealth.
If lump-sum taxes and transfers were available, resources could be reallocated between households so that any tax reform that raises the representative household's welfare would be Pareto improving. While lump-sum transfers may be feasible, the absence of lumpsum taxation is at the very heart of the optimal taxation literature. Note that lump-sum transfers would not be particularly useful in this setting. If such transfers were introduced with the tax reform, low-income households would bene…t but the representative household and wealthy households would be worse o¤ since the transfer would be …nanced by distortionary taxes. Lump-sum transfers could be useful if there were reforms that generated substantial welfare bene…ts for the representative household and for wealthy households, but none of the reforms I have considered have such implications. 18 Without Notes: See Table 4. lump-sum taxation, the potential welfare gains from Pareto improving tax reforms are therefore relatively modest.
The Pareto improving Ramsey reforms also rely on unrealistically high initial tax rates on capital income. If capital income taxes cannot be raised above the initial level, it is typically optimal to wait several decades before eliminating capital income taxation. Implementing reforms with such long pre-announcement periods may be di¢ cult, for example because of commitment problems. The potential welfare gains of such reforms are also modest.
The welfare bene…ts from eliminating capital income taxation are, I argue, less obvious than what has been indicated in the Ramsey optimal taxation literature. In particular, an interesting and relevant theory of optimal taxation must integrate distributional concerns in the analysis. The new optimal taxation theory based on the Mirrlees approach (e.g. Kocherlakota, 2005) may provide a more complete analysis. The conclusion from that analysis may very well be that capital income should not be taxed. But the optimal tax system will then also explicitly handle redistribution between households.
I follow Atkeson et al. (1999) and let W (c t ; C t ; h t ; H t ; ; ) = u (c t ; h t ) + (u ct c t + u ht h t ) + (u Ct C t + u Ht H t ) :
The optimization problem is then max X t=0 t W (c t ; C t ; h t ; H t ; ; ) ( u c0 a 0 + u C0 A 0 ) R 0 1 + c subject to the resource constraint A.14) and the constraints on identical tax rates, The …rst order conditions for K t+1 are t+1 (F Kt+1 + 1 ) = t ;
while equations (A.12), (A.13), (A.14), (A.15), and (A.16) are the …rst order conditions for the multipliers ( , , t , t , and t ).
To solve this problem, I assume that the economy has reached a new steady state T periods after the tax reform. For most experiments, T = 150 turns out to work …ne. For some experiments where taxes cannot be raised initially, I use higher T . Then I guess paths for C t , H t , K t+1 , c t , h t , and the multipliers t , t , t , and , and , and use an equation solver to …nd the equilibrium.
